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European Kinship: Eastern European Women
Go to Market
Anca Parvulescu
In short, feminism must call for a revolution in kinship.
—GAYLE RUBIN, “Traffic in Women”

An episode in Cristian Mungiu’s 2002 film, Occident, presents us with a
scene in a matrimonial agency in Romania: a worried mother is searching
for a husband for her twenty-four-year-old daughter, Mihaela. The conversation in the waiting room informs us that she has brought the necessary bribe because the agency offers good choices: “They have doctors and
Americans.” Once inside, she is asked what nationality she is looking for.
She would prefer “one of ours” but is told the agency only deals in international marriages. Europe, America, and Asia are on the menu. The
mother prefers Europe. The agent shows her a slide with a number of
photographs. “Don’t you have anything younger?” the mother pleads. The
agent rolls his eyes and pulls out another slide. With an almost scientific
gesture, he points to one photograph: a distinguished gentleman from
Saudi Arabia. “He’s ugly,” argues the mother. She takes the initiative and
points to another face—also a distinguished gentleman, from Cyprus, a
sailor. The mother shows her disappointment. “Don’t you have a doctor?”
The agent is irritated; one is ugly, the other one is a sailor. We are not at the
market, he protests, the men are human beings, and there is no bargaining.
The mother is asked to pay the fee and leave a picture and her daughter’s
details. The agent will get back to her. She complies and adds a poem to the
package; the bride-to-be is a poet.
I would like to thank the members of the Women, Gender, and Sexuality Studies workshop
at Washington University for conversations on the margins of an earlier version of this essay.
Katherine Fama, Joe Loewenstein, Steven Meyer, Julia Musha, and Eric Oberle also read and
offered generous comments.
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A series of amusing encounters follow, with Mihaela meeting caricatured older, working-class, uneducated European men. “I write poems,”
she says in French to a man who smiles encouragingly but to whom Baudelaire’s name sounds only vaguely familiar. “Money is not important to
me,” she says in English to a man who gesticulates back that he does not
have it anyway. “I like to travel . . . not to cook, wash,” she adds for another
one. She is clearly not interested in these men, not only because they are
utterly uninteresting but because she is in love with a young Romanian
man, who has just been left by his fiancé, Sorina, for an overweight,
middle-aged Belgian businessman.
Mihaela’s mother is persistent and soon finds her a good match, a wellsituated Italian. He runs a publishing house and has read and liked Mihaela’s
poems. This last detail catches Mihaela’s attention. There is no photograph, but on the phone he passes all the tests; he apparently is young, tall,
even has hair. “If he publishes my poems, I’m going with him,” Mihaela
declares. The Italian is invited to visit. The house is cleaned, local wall art is
replaced by sketches of Roman figures, furniture is moved around, pasta is
cooked. Finally, the big moment comes. The father opens the door and
freezes. “Ciao, sono Luigi,” says a young black man. The family is in disarray. “Nu corespunde” (literally, “he does not correspond”), the father
declares. And yet all the prerequisites are there, and the daughter wants to
marry. The black Italian is a European impossibility they could have not
anticipated. The film’s three alternative endings (in the tradition of Run,
Lola, Run) play with variations on whether the two Romanian women,
Mihaela and Sorina, take the European road to marriage or, in the case of
one, immigrate without marrying or, in the case of the other, settle for the
local husband.
What these scenes in Occident offer us are snapshots of a new Europe.1 I
want to raise the question of how this film and others like it prompt reflection on the European Union predicament and the circulation of women it
seems to facilitate, but challengingly reverse the terms of the discussion to
explore the formation and sedimentation of “Europe” made possible by
the circulation of women. Beginning in the early 1990s, but especially after
1. Occident is the word Romanians used during the cold war to refer to the West. The term
is synonymous with a certain use of the word Europe: Europe as the West.

A N C A P A R V U L E S C U is assistant professor at Washington University in St.
Louis, where she teaches in the Department of English and the Interdisciplinary
Project in the Humanities. She is the author of Laughter: Notes on a Passion
(2010).
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the recent round of European “enlargement,” Romanian and other Eastern European women have become hot objects of exchange, packaged in a
variety of wrappings, whether as domestic servants, nurses, nannies, prostitutes, or wives. Structurally, I will argue, marriage continues to underwrite other forms of exchange, and I will focus on it here. It will be an
occasion to revisit the feminist traffic-in-women argument and reconsider
its implications for the European Union.
Thirty-five years have passed since Gayle Rubin published “The Traffic
in Women: Notes on the ‘Political Economy’ of Sex.”2 Reprinted in various
anthologies, the essay has become a feminist classic, having maintained its
urgency and having been repeatedly used as a springboard for the reconsideration of its arguments in light of new configurations of traffic, economy, political, and sex. Ironically enough, alongside Luce Irigaray’s
articulation of the argument for the French side of second-wave feminism, Rubin’s essay can offer an entry point into the transnational
traffic in women in the current European moment. I will retrace the
archeology of the argument here before I return to Occident. It will be
a somewhat convoluted journey, one, however, that will offer a framework within which to understand what a film like Occident is saying
about the European Union.
The precedent for Rubin’s essay, and an enduring reference point in the
conceptual combination known as traffic in women, is a short article with
the same title written by Emma Goldman in 1910. Goldman writes: “it is
merely a question of degree whether she [woman] sells herself to one man,
in or out of marriage, or to many men. Whether our reformers admit it or
not, the economic and social inferiority of woman is responsible for prostitution.”3 “The traffic in women” is the phrase Goldman uses to describe
the circulation of women between men in general. Rather than referring to
exceptional cases of human trafficking, the traffic-in-women concept describes an economic continuum to which both prostitution and marriage
belong. The difference between prostitution and marriage is one of degree,
a question of how many men participate in the transaction. Scandalous
here is to propose that marriage, the respectable form of women’s circulation, is a variation on the economic theme of prostitution. In the modern
world, this is a scandal for men, who would prefer to have this truth veiled;
and it is a scandal for women, who would prefer to think they enter marriages by virtue of a love choice. Goldman, however, insists that love and
2. See Gayle Rubin, “The Traffic in Women: Notes on the ‘Political Economy’ of Sex,”
in Toward an Anthropology of Women, ed. Rayna R. Reiter (New York, 1975), pp. 157–210.
3. Emma Goldman, “The Traffic in Women,” Red Emma Speaks: An Emma Goldman
Reader, ed. Alix Kates Shulman (New York, 1983), p. 175.

This content downloaded from 128.252.66.152 on Fri, 7 Nov 2014 14:20:41 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

189

190

Anca Parvulescu / European Kinship

marriage belong to two separate registers. In another essay, she declares
that “Marriage is often an economic arrangement purely, furnishing the
woman with a life-long insurance policy.”4 Love is largely irrelevant to the
question of marriage, as it only works to obscure the fact that the system
that circulates women both in prostitution and marriage is an economy
and that this economy should be scrutinized. Goldman thus expressed
skepticism vis-à-vis the feminist movements of her day and the quest for
women’s rights. She came to speak of “the tragedy of woman’s emancipation,” the title of another essay. Emancipation, carrying the etymological
baggage of a release from the power of the manus (the hand of the pater
familias), soon leads to woman being “confronted with the necessity of
emancipating herself from emancipation.”5 Emancipation becomes all too
familiar, remaining within and sustaining the horizon of the family as the
horizon of politics.
Rubin acknowledges her debt to Goldman, but in fact Goldman remains on the margins of her argument throughout, as she develops her
own notion of traffic in women. Rubin not only places it on the continuum
between prostitution and so-called normal forms of exchange, marriage in
particular, but she also describes “a set of arrangements,” which she calls
“the sex/gender system,” through which sex is translated into gender, the
performance of a set of social relations. Her project is to come to a better
understanding of the arrangements that produce women’s position in society. In the course of her analysis, she will show not only that marriage is
always “arranged” but that marital arrangements serve as a foundation for
other forms of societal exchange. Where does one begin such a project?
Rubin proposes we read closely the overlap between Claude Lévi-Strauss’s
and Freud’s descriptions of the social apparatus and women’s place in it
but only after she puts aside her hope in Marx.
Capitalism, the Marxist argument goes, is in the business of extracting
unpaid labor from the laborer, which it turns into surplus-value, the difference between the value of what the laborer produces and his wages,
which are not in any direct correlation to this value but are set in light of
the conditions of production. For Marx, these conditions include commodities like food, clothing, housing, and so on. Wages are meant to cover
these costs and help reproduce the conditions in which the laborer does
more work—from day to day and from one generation of workers to the
next. Rubin, alongside other materialist feminists of her generation, interrupts Marx at this point to emphasize that such commodities come in an
4. Goldman, “What I Believe,” Red Emma Speaks, p. 57.
5. Goldman, “The Tragedy of Woman’s Emancipation,” Red Emma Speaks, p. 160.
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unprocessed form, and they require labor in order to reproduce the laborer. The food is cooked, the clothes washed, the house cleaned, budding
future laborers looked after, and so on. This is “housework,” and it has
traditionally been the labor of women. Women are indispensable to the
reproduction of labor, hence to the production of surplus-value, hence to
capitalist economy. In fact, it can be argued that women’s unpaid labor
within the household is the first source of surplus-value.
How did we get here? In some noncapitalist economic regimens,
women have occupied similar locations, which shows that they in fact
might come before and exceed capitalism. If we are dealing with an economy here, it is not strictly economic, but rather a function of a wider
cultural heritage, a deeper history.6 Friedrich Engels, in The Origin of the
Family, Private Property, and the State, went a step further than Marx in his
analysis of a second type of production, that of human beings themselves.
Engels dissociated the reproduction of the conditions of production
(cooking, cleaning, and so on) from the reproduction of human beings
and located the latter firmly within the institution of the family. His insight
is to have proposed that it is only through a focus on the family that we can
hope to make visible the network of relations within which women live,
including economic relations. He showed that the first “class” to be economically oppressed are women within kinship structures, and their oppression remains at the basis of other forms of economic exploitation.
Rubin finds Engels invaluable for having emphasized this point and for
having produced a major methodological shift towards kinship, but she
also finds that he has not pursued the implications of his insight or not
sufficiently. This is where she turns to Claude Lévi-Strauss and his magisterial Elementary Structures of Kinship.
The fabric of a society, Lévi-Strauss has famously explained, is formed
by a series of cyclical, obligatory, and reciprocal exchanges among kinship
groups. Society is in fact nothing else but this network of exchanges. LéviStrauss draws on Marcel Mauss, who argued, against political philosophers like Thomas Hobbes, that there has never been a state of nature
because any society we know of has had a market form, with its networks of
exchange functioning as a rudimental social contract. This market is not
strictly an economic market because what are exchanged are not solely
economic goods but, in this order in Mauss’s The Gift, “banquets, rituals,
6. For a sketch of where capitalist notions of economy intersect this deeper history, see
Linda Nicholson, “Feminism and Marx: Integrating Kinship with the Economic,” in The
Second Wave: A Reader in Feminist Theory, ed. Nicholson (New York, 1997), pp. 131– 45.
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military services, women, children, dances, festivals, and fairs.”7 This network of exchange is a social contract avant la lettre and is something like an
anthropological first principle.
In an attempt to move from the disjunctive logic of Mauss’s list to a
more systematic description of societal exchange, Lévi-Strauss sifts
through the “inessentials” on this list to argue that there are three levels of
communication in any given society, corresponding to the circulation of
three sets of interrelated objects: “the rules of kinship and marriage serve to
insure the circulation of women between groups, just as economic rules
serve to insure the circulation of goods and services, and linguistic rules the
circulation of messages.”8 The three categories of exchange are goods and
services, signs, and women. The relation among the three goes beyond
mere analogy as Lévi-Strauss makes it clear that women in fact are goods;
and women are signs. The circulation of women in marriage becomes the
arch form of exchange. At the beginning there is the exchange of women.
The incest taboo is the structure’s limit because, according to Lévi-Strauss,
by its means a whole clear-cut network of relations is formed; a woman a
man cannot marry under the incest taboo is necessarily a woman he must
offer to another man.9
The question that interests Rubin is how to read this system of exchange. Most importantly, how immutable is it? (Or, which is the same
thing, how structuralist?) What exactly does feminism set out to change
and how? If one agrees that the exchange and circulation of women constitute the very fabric of culture, is it possible and desirable to fight culture?
At stake, Lévi-Strauss argued, is the very security of the collective, its principle of organization: “It is no exaggeration, then, to say that exogamy is
the archetype of all other manifestations based upon reciprocity, and that
it provides the fundamental and immutable rule ensuring the existence of
the group as a group” (ESK, p. 481). Is feminism struggling against society’s
“fundamental and immutable rule”? Important for Rubin’s stakes is LéviStrauss’s argument that the exchange of women leads to a network of
reciprocal relations among brothers-in-law: “the brother-in-law is ally,
collaborator and friend” (ESK, p. 483). This is the fabric of what Mauss
celebrates under the rubric of solidarity—a solidarity of brothers, collab7. Marcel Mauss, The Gift: The Form and Reason for Exchange in Archaic Societies, trans.
W. D. Halls (1950; New York, 2000), p. 5.
8. Claude Lévi-Strauss, Structural Anthropology, trans. Claire Jacobson and Brooke
Grundfest Schoepf, 2 vols. (New York, 1963), 1:83; hereafter abbreviated SA.
9. See Lévi-Strauss, The Elementary Structures of Kinship, trans. James Harle Bell, John
Richard von Sturmer, and Rodney Needham, ed. Needham (Boston, 1969), p. 51; hereafter
abbreviated ESK.
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orators, and friends. The exchange in women is not only what founds
community but also solidarity, the very foundation of politics. In a long
tradition from Aristotle to Carl Schmitt, politics is a game played among
brothers and friends and brothers qua friends.10 If this is the case, the
feminist predicament is profoundly paradoxical because it implies the
project of articulating a politics against politics.
For her part, Rubin concludes that, while the traffic in women has a lot
of explicative power (“our sex/gender system is still organized by the principles outlined by Lévi-Strauss”),11 structuralist kinship is itself a myth, a
fiction of origins, and a very powerful one at that, as it has added apparently incontestable scientific backing to its many, already seductive folds.
Mauss wrote about The Gift: “We have no wish to put forward this study as
a model to be followed. It only sets out bare indications.”12 Lévi-Strauss
spoke of the goal of his project in terms of it aspiring to be “real, simplifying and explanatory” (SA, 1:35). How, then, does one interrupt a myth that
presents itself as “mere indications” and “real, simplifying and explanatory”? Rubin insists we need to read symptomatically, and she describes
her own reading practice as “freely interpretative, moving from the explicit
content of a text to its presuppositions and implications.”13 It also means to
read exegetically, at the same time acknowledging the undeniable force of
Lévi-Strauss’s work (it is scripturelike) and calling for interpretation. After
all, exegesis often unnoticeably slides into blasphemy.
What results, then, can such a reading practice yield? First of all, it can
provide a few “mutations” in our reading of Lévi-Strauss.14 In Rubin’s
wake, at least two points would be worth revisiting. One is the context in
which Lévi-Strauss—in describing the analogy between words, goods and
services, and women—allows that women occupy a paradoxical objectposition: “Words do not speak, while women do; as producers of signs,
women can never be reduced to the status of symbols or tokens” (SA,
1:61).15 Since kinship is a symbolic structure and ultimately a linguistic
structure, the conflict over the very meaning (and immutability) of kin10. Somewhere else Lévi-Strauss puts it in even more nonambiguous terms: “a certain
kinship tie, the brother-in-law relationship . . . is both sexual and political-social; and,
owing to its complexity, the brother-in-law relationship may perhaps be regarded as an
actual institution” (quoted in Marcela Coelho de Souza, “The Future of the Structural
Theory of Kinship,” in The Cambridge Companion to Lévi-Strauss, ed. Boris Wiseman
[Cambridge, 2009], p. 86).
11. Rubin, “The Traffic in Women,” p. 198.
12. Mauss, The Gift, p. 78.
13. Rubin, “The Traffic in Women,” p. 159.
14. Louis Althusser and Étienne Balibar, Reading Capital, trans. Ben Brewster (London,
1970), p. 25.
15. Another version of this statement reads: “what is communicated in marriage is
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ship is fought in language. Moreover, the reproduction of the myth at the
individual level occurs in language, through the Oedipal reiterative socialization of new generations on their way, as Rubin puts it, toward the missionary position. Women speak and the language they produce circulates,
often on unpredictable trajectories. As producers of signs, they can rewrite
the signs they are. Women are producers of literature in the broadest sense,
and literature is the space in which relation, including that of an exchange between author and reader, has been challengingly rethought,
such that literary signs do not necessarily travel on a traffic-in-women
model.
The second point is the juncture where Lévi-Strauss emphasizes that
kinship is a symbolic structure and thus “an arbitrary system of representations,” but he insists the system is gendered in a unidirectional way:
“could we not conceive of a symmetrical structure, equally simple, where
the sexes could be reversed [a traffic in men]? . . . This is certainly a theoretical possibility. But it is immediately eliminated on empirical grounds.
In human society, it is the men who exchange the women, and not vice
versa” (SA, 1:51, 47). Lévi-Strauss would later renounce this formulation in
favor of what he acknowledges here only as a “theoretical possibility.”
Allowing that traffic can be a two-way street, he would come to say that
“groups consisting of both men and women exchange among themselves
kinship relations.”16 Further responding to his insistent critics, an exasperated Lévi-Strauss would eventually exclaim: “How many times will I have
to repeat that it makes no difference to the theory whether it is men who
exchange women or the opposite?”17 Lévi-Strauss is acknowledging two
things: the initial statement in The Elementary Structures of Kinship was an
infelicitous formulation; but the theoretical apparatus of the book stands
even if we agree that today both men and women participate, as exchangers, in the circulation of kinship relations. These days anybody can play the
wife, but the system of exchange is itself gendered, and there is always a
wife.
Judith Butler revisited this conversation in Antigone’s Claim in an attempt to update Rubin’s argument and offer a queer theory of kinship for
the contemporary world, accounting for the fact that today it would seem
that men and women exchange kinship relations in nontraditional ways.

almost of the same nature as those who communicate (women, on the one hand, men, on
the other)” (SA, 1:297; my emphasis).
16. Lévi-Strauss, The View from Afar, trans. Joachim Neugroschel and Phoebe Hoss
(Chicago, 1992), p. 60.
17. Quoted in Coelho de Souza, “The Future of the Structural Theory of Kinship,” p. 93.
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Butler’s entry point into the conversation is the figure of Antigone, whom
she places on a philosophical continuum between G. W. F. Hegel and
Lévi-Strauss/Jacques Lacan. Butler agrees with Rubin that Lévi-Straussian
moments like the one quoted above are symptomatic of structuralist theories of kinship and their own investment in the immutability of what they
purport to merely describe: “And to the extent that the symbolic reiterates
a ‘structural’ necessity of kinship, does it relay or perform the curse of
kinship itself? In other words, does the structuralist law report on the curse
that is upon kinship or does it deliver that curse?”18 Butler brings Lacan’s
formulations on the symbolic into the conversation, which the latter developed in an explicit engagement with Lévi-Strauss. Given Lévi-Strauss’s
analogy between women and linguistic signs, Lacan posits that kinship
structures, insofar as they are linguistic structures, underwrite the symbolic. Oedipus and the incest taboo offer us linguistic positions that render
culture intelligible. The engagement with Lacan takes the feminist predicament Rubin identified to yet another level of paradox, as kinship becomes
the presupposition of intelligibility, which for Butler also implies livability
because only intelligible lives (and loves) are deemed livable. The question becomes, is feminism struggling not only against society’s “fundamental and immutable rule” but against the very premise of cultural
intelligibility?
In the philosophical tradition Butler traces, Antigone’s name is synonymous with her act of defiance whereby she buries her brother, Polynices,
despite her uncle’s edict that he is to remain unburied. Against Hegel, for
whom Antigone represents kinship at the moment when it is superseded
by the state, Butler argues that Antigone does not act in the name of kinship because her act has only one application. If for Lacan Antigone’s
brother is “pure Being,” a structural/linguistic position within kinship,
which anyone can occupy, Antigone insists that this particular brother is
irreplaceable; he is Polynices, in all his radical singularity. Rather than act
as a guardian of the law of kinship, Antigone acts in the name of (incestuous) love, which, given the incest taboo’s place at the heart of kinship,
cannot be assimilated to a symbolic order and thus remains incommunicable. In being an attack on the incest taboo, Antigone’s act, Butler proposes, is in fact a transgression of kinship “that gives kinship its prohibitive
and normative dimension but that also exposes its vulnerability” (AC, p.
10). Butler focuses on “prohibition” here to draw attention to the dialectic
18. Judith Butler, Antigone’s Claim: Kinship between Life and Death (New York, 2000), p.
66; hereafter abbreviated AC.
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of prohibition and transgression. If prohibitions trigger their own transgression, they also reveal the vulnerability of the law being transgressed.
As with Rubin, the question becomes, what to do with this inheritance?
If Lévi-Strauss seems to be our destiny, how does one face the structuralist
curse? Butler’s solution to the conundrum of immutability (whose symptom is figured as the necessity of Antigone’s death) is to insist, against “the
Lacanians,” that the symbolic is not inseparable from the social and that
change is possible in the field of the social: “Antigone represents neither
kinship nor its radical outside but becomes the occasion for a reading of a
structurally constrained notion of kinship in terms of its social iterability,
the aberrant temporality of the norm” (AC, p. 29). Kinship is a function of
its iterability in a social world, and, as we know from all of Butler’s work,
iterability allows for perversity and aberration. Butler’s way of dealing with
the structuralist inheritance is to foreground its being an inheritance and
to propose Antigone as a figure of the heir. Antigone is what comes after
Oedipus; she is post-Oedipal and poststructuralist, as it were.
In the essay Butler wrote to elaborate on the notion of kinship at work
in Antigone’s Claim—“Is Kinship Always Already Heterosexual?”—she
describes and analyzes the transformation of kinship studies, while criticizing the lack of any apparent parallel progress in psychoanalysis. Butler
argues that structuralist notions of kinship developed by Lévi-Strauss and
his commentators have become anachronistic in the contemporary world
of transnational migration and reproductive technologies.19 She proposes
we live in a postkinship moment, in which kinship, defined as “a set of
practices that institute relationships of various kinds which negotiate the
19. In Antigone’s Claim, Butler describes our historical predicament:
I ask this as well during a time in which children, because of divorce and remarriage, because of migration, exile, and refugee status, because of global displacements of various
kinds, move from one family to another, move from a family to no family, move from no
family to a family, or in which they live, psychically, at the crossroads of the family, or in
multiply layered family situations, in which they may well have more than one woman who
operates as the mother, more than one man who operates as the father, or no mother or no
father, with half-brothers who are also friends—this is a time in which kinship has become
fragile, porous, and expansive. It is also a time in which straight and gay families are sometimes blended, or in which gay families emerge in nuclear and nonnuclear forms. [AC, pp.
22–23]
The irony in Butler’s formulation is that the family literally seems to have proliferated and
multiplied. But the fact that there is a family for every taste and need (according to class) does
not mean that the institution is in crisis, only that it can elastically adjust to pressures. Indeed,
this is perhaps most visible in global situations of migration and displacement, as a film like
When Mother Comes Home for Christmas (dir. Nilita Vachani, 1995) shows. When it comes to
the effects of globalization on children, it is not that children globally have access to a nonOedipal, queer socialization; it is only that the privileges of the normative family are unevenly
distributed globally.
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reproduction of life and the demands of death” and that “address fundamental forms of human dependency, which may include birth, child rearing,
relations of emotional dependency and support, generational ties, illness,
dying, and death (to name a few),” is inseparable from community and
friendship and knows a multiplicity of nontraditional sites in addition to
Oedipal reproduction and heterosexuality.20 While the political project of
imagining a post-Oedipal and poststructuralist kinship is laudable, and in
the best tradition of radical feminism, how will it account for the fact that,
despite and perhaps within the horizon of what Butler describes as the
crisis in the family, the traffic in women seems to have gone global but
otherwise goes on undisturbed? Alongside the institution of the brotherin-law and homosocial exchange, the traffic in women is left behind as
anachronistic in Butler’s postkinship framework. Is it, however, anachronistic to argue, as I will, that the scene in Occident with which I began
dramatizes the traffic in women in the contemporary moment and thus
asks us to rethink what critical use we can still make of the concept? Antigone’s Claim is perhaps most productively read at the level of tone (Stimmung). Butler is tired of structuralism, of hearing the sentence, “but it’s the
law!” In the face of neoformalist defensive mechanisms against the purported threat of psychic disarray (change leads to trauma), Butler’s voice
retains the urgency of change in kinship even as she agrees that Antigone
cannot be romanticized or taken as an example.
Two years after the publication of Rubin’s “The Traffic in Women,” on
the other side of second-wave feminism, Irigaray published This Sex Which
Is Not One, which included two suggestive chapter titles: “Women on the
Market” and “Commodities among Themselves.” Looking back at 1970s
Western feminism, it is striking to note the overlap between Rubin and
Irigaray, an overlap that today appears as an invitation to reconsider what
for a long time seemed to be two incompatible faces of second-wave feminism. Traffic in women is a point where the two feminisms almost seem to
agree on a common radical project. There is a bit more work to do, then,
before we return to Occident and the European Union.
Irigaray begins with a matter-of-fact statement: “The society we know,
our own culture, is based upon the exchange of women. Without the exchange of women, we are told [dit-on], we would fall back into the anarchy
(?) of the natural world, the randomness (?) of the animal kingdom. The
passage into the social order, into the symbolic order, into order as such, is
assured by the fact that men, or groups of men, circulate women among
20. Butler, “Is Kinship Always Already Heterosexual?” Differences 13 (Spring 2002): 14 –15.
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themselves, according to a rule known as the incest taboo.”21 Irigaray mimics the language of Lévi-Strauss. She does not seem to question the first
apparent truth here: society as we know it is based on the exchange of
women. When it comes to where we would be without this exchange,
however, mimicry doubles as incredulity: “we are told” (by whom? in the
name of what interest?) that without the exchange of women “we” would
regress into two related forms of monstrosity—anarchy and animality.
Irigaray’s question marks punctuate the irony that, as Lévi-Strauss knows,
neither of these are unproblematically presocial in any strict sense.
What is clear for Irigaray, as for Rubin, is that the exchange of women
“is an economic issue, perhaps even subtends economy as such?” (TS, p.
172). Irigaray turns to Marx to do the work of exegetical reading that Rubin
does with Lévi-Strauss to conclude that in capitalism men “exchange their
women-commodities among themselves” (TS, p. 173). Irigaray reads
Marx’s Capital by way of “going back through analogism” (TS, p. 174 n. 3),
the analogy between women and commodities, to focus on Marx’s use of
prosopopoeia, whereby in his account commodities are dressed and undressed, step forth, stand on their heads, and, indeed, speak. Irigaray’s
“women-commodities” name the more-than-analogy already at work in
Marx’s description of how commodities (those enigmatic things) acquire
value. There is no going back to women-commodities’ use-value because
they are always already caught in an exchange in which they have value
only insofar as they are compared to other women-commodities as objects
of a potential exchange. A woman has value insofar as she channels the
homosocial desire between at least two men.22 Thus the virginal woman is
pure exchange-value until she is “consumed,” after which she becomes
reproductive use-value as mother. The prostitute is something of a glitch
in the system, as she is in fact a combination of the two, exchangeable
use-value.
Irigaray draws attention to Lévi-Strauss’s explanation of the exchange
of women through their scarcity: “‘the deep polygamous tendency, which
exists among all men, always makes the number of available women seem
insufficient. Let us add that, even if there were as many women as men,
these women would not all be equally desirable . . . and that, by defini21. Luce Irigaray, This Sex Which Is Not One, trans. Catherine Porter and Carolyn Burke
(Ithaca, N.Y., 1985), p. 170; hereafter abbreviated TS.
22. See René Girard, Deceit, Desire, and the Novel: Self and Other in Literary Structure, trans.
Yvonne Freccero (Baltimore, 1965). For an account of the volatile historicity of homosocial
desire and a historical anchoring of homosexuality on the male homosocial spectrum, see Eve
Kosofsky Sedgwick, Between Men: English Literature and Male Homosocial Desire (New York,
1985).
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tion . . . , the most desirable women must form a minority’” (TS, p. 170). In
other words, men are by definition polygamous, and, faced with this
“fact,” there simply aren’t enough women to satisfy their desire. Women
are a minority in the face of men’s insatiable desire. Moreover, men desire
many women, and not just any women, only desirable women. Desirability is posited as a property of the object (women’s bodies), which in its turn
is desirable by virtue of being desired by men. It is clear for Irigaray that
economy has a libidinal core.23 The desire that moves it is infinitely polygamous, as any man desires to capitalize more women than the others. It
follows that women are strangely equal: “the equality of women among
themselves, but in terms of laws of equivalence that remain external to
them” (TS, pp. 184 – 85). Women are equal, insofar as they are separated
from each other by the “general equivalent” (“the sublime standard,”
Irigaray calls it) that functions as the measuring stick according to which they
are compared (TS, p. 181). Women’s separateness guarantees that they cannot
exchange themselves among themselves. Structurally, the argument goes,
women cannot desire each other because desire itself flows within an economy
in which women are strictly/structurally objects of desire.
Irigaray too reaches a point where the question of immutability imposes
itself:
For, without the exploitation of women, what would become of the
social order? What modifications would it undergo if women left behind their condition as commodities—subject to being produced,
consumed, valorized, circulated, and so on, by men alone—and took
part in elaborating and carrying out exchanges? Not by reproducing,
by copying, the ‘phallocratic’ models that have the force of law today,
but by socializing in a different way the relation to nature, matter, the
body, language, and desire. [TS, p. 91]
And: “But what if these ‘commodities’ refused to go to ‘market’? What if they
maintained ‘another’ kind of commerce, among themselves?” (TS, p. 196).
It is not an easy thing to do, this refusal. Irigaray anticipates the response:
“Utopia? Perhaps. Unless this mode of exchange has undermined the order of commerce from the beginning . . . a certain economy of abundance” (TS, p. 197). Irigaray’s vision is not a utopia if one strategically
posits sexual difference and thus the fact that the male commerce in
women has been paralleled by another kind of commerce from the
beginning.
23. It is Irigaray’s take on what Jean-François Lyotard condenses in the question, “What Is
the Desire Named Marx?” See Jean-François Lyotard, Libidinal Economy, trans. Iain Hamilton
Grant (Bloomington, Ind., 1993), pp. 114 –15.
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The question is, where does one look for traces of this other commerce
in the folds of a culture predicated on its nonexistence? The last chapter of
This Sex Which Is Not One, “When Our Lips Speak Together,” is Irigaray’s
literary experiment, an attempt to stage a different kind of commerce.
Here, an unidentified I speaks to an unidentified you. I and you are a two
that cannot be separated into ones. There is a continuous exchange, but no
transaction, no contract, no traffic in women. The sense of touch offers
Irigaray a way to envision this other commerce, beyond both gift and debt.
“I touch you” carries the possibility of being at the same time transitive and
reflexive (se toucher toi). One touches the other and oneself at the same
time: “I’m touching you, that’s quite enough to let me know that you are
my body.” Touch is also the only sense that can function as a guarantor of
existence: “I/you touch you/me, that’s quite enough for us to feel alive.”
There is no organ of touch to channel the sensation on striated paths;
touching is experienced by the surface of the skin as a whole: “you are
there—like my skin” (TS, pp. 208, 209, 216). This is a form of circulation
that does not distinguish between subject and subject and between subject
and object: “Exchange? Everything is exchanged, yet there are no transactions. Between us, there are no proprietors, no purchasers, no determinable objects, no prices. Our bodies are nourished by our mutual pleasure.
Our abundance is inexhaustible: it knows neither want nor plenty. Since
we give each other (our) all with nothing held back, nothing hoarded, our
exchanges are without terms, without end. How can I say it? The language
we know is so limited . . .” (TS, pp. 213–14). And yet Irigaray insists one
needs to struggle to wrest the intensity of this feeling from language. The
other commerce has been there all along from the beginning; one is in
touch with it, even if there are no words for it. “Let’s hurry and invent our
own phrases” (TS, p. 215). Irigaray’s hope is that we will be able to say “I
love you” on the model of “I touch you,” eventually bringing love back to
a scene Goldman imagined as incompatible with it.
Irigaray’s you opens into a relation with a reader. One of the most
challenging “dialogues” has been that between Irigaray and Italian feminists, the Milan Bookstore Collective in particular.24 The bookstore itself
(the Milan bookstore opened in 1975) is a “practice of relationships among
women” that performs a form of commerce, circulating signs, desire, and
24. The question of whether there can be a “dialogue” without a traffic in signs modeled on
the traffic in women imposes itself here. Poststructuralist notions of literature towards which
Irigaray gestures were developed in response to Habermasian theories of communication as a
form of trading in signs. See especially Jean-Luc Nancy, The Inoperative Community, trans.
Peter Connor et al., ed. Connor (Minneapolis, 1991).
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commodities.25 Importantly, the Milanese women refuse the equality offered them through the traffic in women. The practice of what they call
“the symbolic mother” assumes that one woman can learn from another,
with whom she has an asymmetric, unequal relationship.26 The Milanese
women refuse the proper name, publishing their book collectively. They
also refuse property, offering the space of the bookstore to all who enter it.
Beyond any calls for emancipation or rights, the bookstore is a “theoretical
practice” that effectively rewrites the traffic in women.27 Irigaray’s utopia is
read by the Milanese women as a very concrete starting point of practice.
Another “dialogue” would be one that would assume Irigaray’s you
finds an oblique echo in Jacques Derrida. Ultimately, the different “I love
you” Irigaray is after would have to contaminate the notion of friendship
that functions as the foundation of politics. Derrida takes up the issue,
making sure we remember that “the figure of the friend, so regularly coming back on stage with the features of the brother . . . seems spontaneously
to belong to a familial, fraternalist and thus androcentric configuration of
politics.”28 Before being properly political, the politics of friendship is always already haunted by kinship. It is important to emphasize, however,
that one is not born a brother: “Do you not think, dear friend, that the
brother is always a brother of alliance, a brother in law or an adoptive
brother, a foster brother?” (PF, p. 177). In the context of a book on touch,
Derrida elaborates, drawing attention to the fact that “the word [fraternity] privileges some ‘virility.’ Even if he is an orphan, a brother is a son
and therefore a man. In order to include the sister or woman or daughter,
one has to change words— generously—and then change the word ‘generosity’ itself while one is at it.”29 For Derrida, too, it is clear that this is our
inheritance, a testament Europeans inherit from their Greek forefathers.
In that, however, it is also an opportunity: “the testament is the Bible of
25. The Milan Women’s Bookstore Collective, Sexual Difference: A Theory of Social-Symbolic
Practice, trans. Patricia Cicogna and Teresa de Lauretis (Bloomington, Ind., 1990), p. 50.
26. “Naming the fact of disparity among women was certainly the decisive step. It meant
breaking with the equalization of all women and their consequent submission to the
distinctions set by male thought according to its criteria and the needs of men’s social
intercourse. It meant that among women there can and must be established a regime of
exchange to make that plus of female origin circulate, that plus which acknowledged inequality
introduces among them. From being objects of exchange, as they were in the male world,
women can and must become subjects of exchange” (ibid., p. 112).
27. The female sociality the Milanese women envision is premised on the debt a daughter
has to repay to her symbolic mother. Gratitude is a necessary ingredient of this payment,
arguably bringing reciprocity back at the level of affect.
28. Jacques Derrida, The Politics of Friendship, trans. George Collins (1997; London, 2005),
p. viii; hereafter abbreviated PF.
29. Derrida, On Touching—Jean-Luc Nancy, trans. Christine Irizarry (Stanford, Calif.,
2005), p. 22.
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hermeneutics” (PF, p. 177). Reading the testamentary inheritance in an
attempt to denaturalize the figure of the brother and especially Carl
Schmitt’s pretense that his placement of the friend/enemy distinction at
the heart of the political is a mere “diagnosis,” Derrida finds in the same
“tradition” the graft for a “friendship without friendship,” beyond friendship qua brotherhood, an an-economic friendship based on an asymmetrical, unequal, but also nonreciprocal and nonprofitable relation with an
other. The relation is imagined by Derrida as a mixture of friendship and
love in the middle voice, aimance he calls it, borrowing from the literary
field. This loving friendship allows for a woman-friend; a woman can be a
partner in relation rather than a conduit to it. For Derrida, this means to
move beyond the exemplary figure of the prostitute (Georges Bataille’s
Edwarda)30 to a new figure of the sister who is not only not a variation on the
brother but also not the sister of a sisterhood. We are beyond the traffic-inwomen concept here because we are beyond community as we know it. The
sister is the “ally, collaborator and friend”—the new comrade, if you will.
For Lévi-Strauss, while kinship remains linked to the family, it is still a
symbolic system. It is a “system of attitudes” resulting in a range of affects
(SA, 1:38). What it does is “‘pump’ women out of their consanguineous
families to redistribute them in affinal groups” (SA, 1:309). The notion of
affinity opens the gate for the term kinship to describe affective relations
among a variety of groups. We can thus move from Lévi-Strauss’s “elementary structures of kinship” to ever more “complex structures.” Most
importantly, the nation can be imagined as a community of “affines,” a
brotherhood or fraternity brought together by the affective mix called
patriotism. The nation is an affective economy; in Benedict Anderson’s
words, it is a “deep, horizontal comradeship . . . a fraternity.”31 What theorists of nationalism often do not pursue is the implication that the brothers whose connections form the fabric of the nation are brothers-in-law,
brothers by virtue of an ever more diffuse and largely imaginary exchange
of goods and services, signs, and indeed women. The nation is predicated
on the possibility of an exchange among the brothers of the imagined
fraternity.
Today a film like Occident challenges us to ask, is it possible to think of
a transnational entity like Europe as a “complex structure” of kinship? In
30. See, for example, Lyotard’s recourse to Edwarda in Libidinal Economy, pp. 135– 43.
31. Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of
Nationalism (London, 1989), p. 16.
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order to begin to answer this question, one has to enter the terrain of
European studies and its modes of discourse.
Although not aspiring to nationhood, the European Union often falls
back on the archaic language of the family.32 But whether with recourse to
the familial structure or not, the European Union imagines itself as a community. The “European market” was instituted in 1957 under the name of
the European Economic Community. The 1992 Treaty of Maastricht
shifted the name to the European Union and performed an unprecedented
transnational double move: it created “European citizenship” and the conditions for the euro. As a market, the European Union is a system of
exchanges. The most visible objects of exchange are economic in nature—
goods and services. But the European Union also circulates signs within a
structure imagined as a public sphere. Significantly, Jürgen Habermas has
revisited his theory of the public sphere in light of the perceived urgency to
think the European Union as a public sphere.33 At the most basic level, the
European Union circulates languages and translations. It is the job of European media, like Euronews, to facilitate linguistic exchange. Although
they have not achieved the status of pan-European sources of information
and continue to be sifted through global networks, these media are instrumental in at least building the illusion of a common European public space.
An important dimension of Europe’s network of circulation is education. The Erasmus Program is a highly successful exchange program, circulating students on their way to becoming European citizens.34 European
tourism is in close proximity to educational programs. Europe sponsors a
number of cultural events that mobilize large numbers of bodies to move
across its erased borders. Most successful among them has been the European Capital of Culture program, designed to “help bring European citizens closer together” (“W”). In 2007 the European Parliament started the
European Film Prize (LUX), which facilitates the subtitling of the winning
32. The 2007 European Union “enlargement,” for example, was announced under the
banner of “Romania and Bulgaria join the European Family.” The first Romanian European
commissioner, Leonard Orban, described the moment: “The fifth round of enlargement is now
complete with Romania and Bulgaria’s accession to the EU. This is a historic moment, both for
the EU and for the new member states. Most Romanians believe that EU accession represents
the moment when their country has returned to the European family” (quoted in “Romania
and Bulgaria Join the European Family,” The Parliament, 15 Jan. 2007).
33. See especially the essays collected in Jürgen Habermas, Europe: The Faltering Project,
trans. Ciaran Cronin (Malden, Mass., 2009).
34. The European Commission’s Education and Training webpage quotes an exchange
student, Stefanie Bakelandt: “I realized that the experience made a whole new person of me and
that I would never look at the world and Europe, my home, like I did before” (quoted in “Who Is
the 2 Millionth Erasmus Student?” European Commission Education and Training,
ec.europa.eu/education/news/news1813_en.htm; hereafter abbreviated “W”).
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film into all European languages and makes it available in all member
states. In 2009, the European Union Prize for Literature was inaugurated
to “promote the circulation of literature within Europe and encourage
greater interest in non-national literary works” (“W”). These programs are
conducted under the large umbrella of culture, and their explicit goal is the
circulation of the signs that form culture.
To slowly make our way back to Occident, the question is, how do the
beneficiaries of the European Union’s eastward expansion fare in this exchange? The essence of the kinship structure described by Mauss or LéviStrauss is that the relations it entails are reciprocal (I throw a party for you;
you throw a party for me). But in the economic desert that was most of
Eastern Europe of the 1990s, one could hear a recurrent complaint: “We
have nothing to sell.”35 The countries of Eastern Europe had few desirable
commodities for the consumer heavens of glitzy Western Europe. As for
the public sphere, there has not been much of an exchange in signs either,
as European intellectual exchange is most often a one-way street. With the
exception of a few émigrés from the cold war era, who tend to reproduce
cold war narratives in neoliberal garb, few Eastern European voices are
part of a genuine intellectual exchange across the East/West European
divide.36 In many ways, the current situation continues a cold war pattern
35. This was a striking line in Andrei Codrescu’s Romania: My Old Haunt (2002).
36. The by-now locus classicus for this debate is the appeal Habermas and Derrida
cosigned in 2003 (which Habermas alone wrote) in response to the invasion of Iraq. See
Habermas and Derrida, “February 15, or What Binds Europeans Together: A Plea for a
Common Foreign Policy, Beginning in the Core of Europe,” trans. Max Pensky, Constellations
10, no. 3 (2003): 291–97. Habermas expresses his hope here that 15 February 2003, the day of
mass demonstrations in major Western European capitals against the war, could be seen as a
sign of “the birth of a European public sphere” (p. 291). Given Central and Eastern European
nations’ alliance with the U.S. on the issue of the Iraq War, this is a suggestive choice of a birth
date. Habermas’s appeal is for a Europe “beyond any Eurocentrism,” one, however, that begins
in something called “the core” of Europe (p. 291). Habermas does not entertain the possibility
that there is Eurocentrism vis-à-vis other Europeans and that this “core” (even as the
technocratic Kerneuropa) is its symptom. Habermas is explicitly nostalgic for the good old days
of pre-1989 European prosperity. The European identity he calls for, elsewhere flavored by a
specifically European patriotism, is articulated primarily against an American other, but also
disruptive Central and Eastern European others. Habermas’s explanation for these latter
countries’ support of the war is that “while certainly working hard for their admission into the
EU, [they] are nevertheless not yet ready to place limits on the sovereignty that they have so
recently regained” (p. 292). The thought that the support of the U.S.-led war might be a
reaction against “the core” of Europe and its patronizing attitude does not find its way into this
incipient “dialogue.” Instead, Habermas continues, “Taking a leading role does not mean
excluding. The avant-gardist core of Europe must not wall itself off into a new Small Europe. It
must—as it has so often— be the locomotive” (p. 292). As Europe has indeed often done in the
past, it should simply take on a leadership role in the shaping of world history. While
Habermas’s intention to intervene in the urgency of the political moment is laudable (see
Derrida’s signature), it is difficult to imagine a European public sphere birthed in this 2003
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of Western European intellectuals whispering into Eastern ears the secret
to their emancipation.37
But if Eastern European goods and services, on the one hand, and signs,
on the other, seemed to be scarce as objects of European exchange, what
the countries of Eastern Europe in the wake of 1989 did have were women.
It was often said that they were “good women”— good for taking to the
market, that is. Among other things, they were thought to be untainted by
feminism. Having passed through the “real-existing socialist” experiment,
they have nonetheless come out as traditional women, who cook, clean,
and smile. Matrimonial agencies promise they would be “grateful.” They
are often referred to as “model-looking,” a euphemism that describes the
fact that their bodies do not carry (yet) traces of what Europeans dread
under the name of “McDonaldization.” Within the global market of
women, they are also white and therefore can pass for European wives.38

document. The very spectacle of the public sphere Habermas orchestrated on this occasion, the
concomitant publication of a number of articles on Europe signed by his friends and
collaborators (Umberto Eco, Adolf Muschg, Gianni Vatttimo, Richard Rorty, Fernando
Savater), did not include any Eastern European intellectuals, not to mention a woman.
Significantly, Habermas would dismiss such objections as unproductive sensitivities. See Gustav
Seibt, “Please Don’t Be So Sensitive: Jürgen Habermas Continues Arguing for Europe in
Berlin,” Old Europe, New Europe, Core Europe: Transatlantic Relations after the Iraq War, ed.
Daniel Levy, Pensky, and John Torpey (London, 2005), p. 132. Habermas would return to these
formulations to say that a European policy of gradual integration (premised on a core and a
periphery) assumes that Eastern European countries can “align themselves with the
center . . . have the option of joining the centre at any time” (Habermas, “European Politics at
an Impasse: A Plea for a Policy of Graduated Integration,” Europe, p. 103; my emphasis).
Habermas seems to assume that the Eastern European response to his proposal should be:
thank you very much. If historical events have their moments of farcical repetition, from this
perspective European unification promises to be the farcical repetition of German unification.
37. Étienne Balibar writes: “In the second half of the 1980s, several among us had seen or
heard, in Prague and elsewhere, Western intellectuals and politicians ‘selling’ (against the
recognition of anticipated debt) the ‘bright future’ to dissidents, to resisters who were
preparing, morally and politically, the end of dictatorship. The bright future was contained in
three words: market, democracy, Europe” (Balibar, We, the People of Europe? Reflections on
Transnational Citizenship, trans. James Swenson [Princeton, N. J., 2004], pp. 78 –79).
38. Although they can pass, Eastern European women are not quite “white.” Rosi Braidotti
writes: “peoples from the Balkans, or the South-Western regions of Europe, in so far as they are
not yet ‘good Europeans,’ they are also not quite as ‘white’ as others” (Rosi Braidotti, “On
Becoming Europeans,” in Women Migrants from East to West: Gender, Mobility, and Belonging
in Contemporary Europe, ed. Luisa Passerini et al. [New York, 2007], p. 34). Balibar also notes
that in the European Union cultural difference can easily slip into racial stigmatization. He
specifically warns against the risks of a new apartheid, itself historically dependent on a
racialized distinction between Europeans, non-Europeans, and not-quite-Europeans (see the
situation of Polish immigrants in South Africa). The idea of Europe suddenly having to deal
with race as a result of immigration is, of course, misleading. Europe has failed to face the
racialization of its Roma population for centuries. That in the current European moment the
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They can reproduce white children in a Europe worried about the birth
rate among its “native” population. They raise these children dutifully,
disseminating the motherly love that, it is argued, has become scant in the
Western world in the wake of second-wave feminism. Eastern Europe is a
fresh reservoir of love.39
Since one cannot forever live on credit, not responding to the economic
“gifts” coming from the wealthier members of the European Union, lest
one loses face (Mauss’s word for status and honor), Eastern European
countries export women. In return, one does not get other women (it is not
a trend, as far as I know, for, say, French women to marry, say, Bulgarian
men), but goods and services. Any marriage comes with gifts, Lévi-Strauss
knows. This is an oblique, fragile form of reciprocity and an unequal one,
an ironic comment on Lévi-Strauss’s warning that there will always be
those who try to acquire more wives, aesthetically or economically more
appealing. Unequal exchange is a sign of what Derrida fears under the
name of generosity, which translates into political prestige for the party
who offers more than can be reciprocated. It is the privilege of the Big
Man—and First World nations.40
When it comes to transnational European marriage, as a rule Eastern
European women marrying on the European market marry down, according to what sociologists call the marriage gradient. This is the very eloquent
class- and gender-determined principle according to which men marry
down economically and socially while women marry up. Eastern European women thus marry the “undesirable” men of Western Europe.41 They

Roma have become visible as Eastern European shows that they are now doubly racialized: once
as Roma and once as Eastern European.
39. On the global dimensions of this phenomenon, see Arlie Russell Hochschild, “Love and
Gold,” Global Woman: Nannies, Maids, and Sex Workers in the New Economy, ed. Barbara
Ehrenreich and Hochschild (New York, 2002), pp. 15–30.
40. Péter Esterházy asks rhetorically, in response to the Habermas/Derrida affair: “What is
this EU expansion for? Out of altruism, out of courtesy?” (Péter Esterházy, “How Big Is the
European Dwarf?” trans. Judith Sollosy, in Old Europe, New Europe, Core Europe, p. 77).
41. It will be asked, what of cases when women marrying transnationally marry men they
love? Lévi-Strauss’s argument is that in modern societies the networks of exchange might be
more ambiguous, hybrid marital forms might have appeared, conceptual personas might have
shifted (in Occident the mother does the “courting”), often systems that regulate marriage
operate strictly through negative injunctions, but the structural channels of exchange are still in
force. Modern women might “choose” by way of love, but choice is never free choice. Marriage
is a communication game with strict rules. What we call choice is a function of when a given
player can make one move but not another. There is no society, however progressive, LéviStrauss feels the need to repeat, in which one can marry just anyone. Laura Kipnis notes the
consistency in our love choices, which visibly bear the signs of racial, class, and other “affinal”
appurtenances; see Laura Kipnis, Against Love: A Polemic (New York, 2003). We are very
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marry the men Western women for one reason or another do not want, the
odds and ends of the national marriage market. Europe in fact performs a
gendered redistribution of class across the West/East divide. An Eastern
European woman marries up simply by virtue of marrying a Western man,
even if he would not be a match for her locally.
What is exported through women is affective labor. Nannies, maids, and
nurses care for their employers in wealthy European nations. Wives do the
same kind of labor, except that they are not paid and do not benefit from labor
protections. It is a much better economic deal for a German working-class
man to marry a Romanian woman than to hire a domestic servant to take care
of his house, a nurse to attend to his elders, and a prostitute to have sex with
occasionally (the question of whether he could manage these tasks by himself
is beside the point). The Romanian wife brings it all in one package.42 That
there is emotional attachment in the mix only reinforces the point that affect
and sex-affective labor is being circulated. The labor involved in affective labor, as Michael Hardt and others have argued, has as its stakes the production
of a relationship, in this case a marital relationship. Laura Kipnis’s recent polemic argues that all contemporary domestic relationships require a lot of

predictable in our freedom. The counterpoint to Kipnis’s argument is a book like Stephanie
Coontz, Marriage, a History: How Love Conquered Marriage (New York, 2005). Coontz writes:
“Today most people expect to live their lives in a loving relationship, not in a rigid institution.
Although most people want socially sanctioned relationships, backed by institutional
protections, few would sacrifice their goal of a loving, fair, and flexible relationship for those
protections” (p. 10). The point Kipnis is making is precisely that love has “conquered”
marriage—leading to what Coontz calls “the love revolution.” Today it is through love that the
institution of marriage does its economic and political work. What Coontz does not consider is
the fact that there is, of course, love and love.
42. Needless to say, Eastern European women are not traditional brides-in-waiting, though
internet descriptions market them as such (in Occident, Mihaela insists she does not cook,
wash, and so on). Traditional women do not marry foreigners through matrimonial agencies.
These women are active and knowledgeable in marketing techniques and do what they deem
necessary to sell. Indeed, one could say that they are career oriented, except that (for now at
least) marriage is the only career available to them. They present themselves as prefeminist ideal
wives in order to have a chance to attract attention on a very busy market. But a lot of aesthetic
labor (in some ways similar to that done by models to which they are likened) goes into the
production of organic femininity. See also Svitlana Taraban, “Birthday Girls, Russian Dolls, and
Others: Internet Bride as the Emerging Global Identity of Post-Soviet Women,” in Living
Gender after Communism, ed. Janet Elise Johnson and Jean C. Robinson (Bloomington, Ind.,
2007) pp. 105–27. Among other things, marriage to a Western man is appealing to Eastern
European women precisely because they imagine the Western world to be one of gender
egalitarianism. This is a global variation on the motif of “marriage envy”; if in the postfeminist
American context the phenomenon unfolds under a cynical refrain (“But I want to get
married”), the marriage envy of Eastern European women, while not naı̈ve, belongs to a
disjointed feminist and postcolonial time. On marriage envy, see Suzanne Leonard, “Marriage
Envy,” Women’s Studies Quarterly 34 (Fall–Winter 2006): 43– 64.
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labor (we are forever working on them), but it is important to emphasize that
affective relationship labor can take many forms globally. Likewise, if, as Hardt
argues, immaterial affective labor has become generalized through the postmodern, informational economy and “women’s work” is a model for this
larger trend, one still feels the need to distinguish among acutely gendered
labor situations in which “the division between economy and culture begins to
break down.”43 In the imaginary case above, the Romanian woman in the
German household is both at work and at home, participating around the
clock, in both production and reproduction, creating life and community, in
a precarious labor situation with no labor rights, no protection, and no guarantee of remuneration. This is immaterial affective labor, but it also needs to
be rethought as “women’s work” in a European and international frame.
It is clear that we are dealing with a new form of imperialism; Arlie Russell
Hochschild calls it “emotional imperialism,” whereby emotional resources are
extracted from poor countries. Ironically for feminism, this is emotional caring work (which does not preclude physical work) that compensates for the
labor many Western women do not do anymore, having become suspicious of
their traditional roles as caretakers.44 The message seems to be that any household will have its women, even if they have to be outsourced. Eastern European women do the housework that was the center of debate for second-wave
feminism. Rather than have it redistributed between the men and women of
wealthy nations, it has been outsourced to economically less fortunate
women. Among the successes of second-wave feminism one needs to list the
situation in which an Italian female academic hiring a Romanian nanny to
care for her children while she is working (for example, writing an article)
occupies the structural position of exchanger, while at the same time reinforcing the gendered structure of exchange. To push this to a Goldman-like level of
scandal, there are indeed women pimps.
The European Union has encouraged the mobility of labor since its
inception. What is new in the recent predicament is the large number of
women who, although theoretically European, travel to Europe for work
and marriage. It is a larger phenomenon that has led critics to talk about
43. Michael Hardt, “Affective Labor,” Boundary 2 26 (Summer 1999): 96. On the overlap
between the feminization of labor understood on a traffic-in-women model and the
autonomist Marxists’ theorization of “immaterial labor,” see also Sianne Ngai, “The Zany
Science,” lecture presented at the Henry E. Huntington Library, San Marino, Calif., 2009.
44. Western women are not as emancipated as this scenario makes them sound. Enrica
Capusotti writes about “Italian women’s renegotiation of their position within contemporary
transnational processes: women migrants are exploited for the self-representation of Italian
women to finally become modern, emancipated and fully Western” (Passerini et al., “Editor’s
Introduction,” in Women Migrants from East to West, p. 13).
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the feminization of migration tout court.45 Despite the focus on the aggressiveness of the “Polish plumber,” what circulates is a feminized labor force.
This is not an issue for debate in the European public sphere because it is
often invisible labor— housework. But even when this labor becomes visible and audible, this issue still does not become in Habermas’s framework
for the public sphere relevant enough for European debate. One of the
functions of the public sphere is to filter public discourse, which also
means to foreclose certain dialogues.46 It is unlikely that the traffic in
women in all its ramifications will be on the European agenda in the near
future. After all, no family washes its dirty linen in public.
Occident makes it clear that for a Romanian the European is not a foreigner in the same way a Saudi man is.47 There are some affinities among
Romanians and Belgians or Italians. They too were once structurally impossible matches, but not anymore. Mihaela’s parents, very much of the
generation that lived the “real-existing socialism” experiment in isolation
(a famous actor of socialist-realist films plays Mihaela’s father), are willing
and proactive in securing a European marriage for her. But, according to
their logic, there are no black Europeans. Europe is a function of a set of
languages (a lot is made of Romanian and Italian being Romance languages or sister languages); tradition (see the sketches of Roman profiles
and their physiognomic assumptions); culture (pasta, music, but also an
assumed layer of shared civility as mannered behavior, exploited for comic
effect but also doing ideological work). Europe is also the performance of
exclusion on tacit racial and religious grounds, as evidenced in Occident by
the black Italian and as the debates about Turkey’s candidacy to join the
European Union demonstrate. Although he is both an Italian and a European citizen, Luigi is still not European, which is why he does not “corre45. See Ehrenreich and Hochschild, introduction to Global Woman, p. 5.
46. On the public sphere’s filtering function, see Habermas, “Political Communication in
Media Society: Does Democracy Still Have an Epistemic Dimension? The Impact of Normative
Theory on Empirical Research,” Europe, p. 159. The literature of the feminist critique of
Habermas is extensive. See especially Feminists Read Habermas: Gendering the Subject of
Discourse, ed. Johanna Meehan (New York, 1995).
47. Irigaray writes: “Exogamy doubtless requires that one leave one’s family, tribe, or clan,
in order to make alliances. All the same, it does not tolerate marriage with populations that are
too far away, too far removed from the prevailing cultural rules” (TS, p. 172). At stake is a
distinction between global kinship markets and European markets. While the European Union,
despite vocal insistence to the contrary, is among other things also a symptom of globalization,
Europe remains a cultural entity with pervasive effects for kinship. In terms of marriage
markets, this means that for the Romanian mother in Occident the European husband has
become in a certain sense “one of ours” in ways that a Saudi man has not. For the purposes of
this argument, an American can be “one of ours” in this sense, insofar as he is of European
descent (white).
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spond” (friends “correspond,” in that they are a symmetrical match for
each other; they “answer” to each other). He thus cannot participate in the
European traffic in women. For Mihaela’s father, who would need to accept him as a partner in exchange, he is African. And Africa is not even on
the global map offered by the Romanian matrimonial agency, that is, before Mihaela’s options are narrowed to the familiar European marriage.
Mihaela’s parents put pressure on her to marry (she is twenty-four and
they fear she is getting old), but they do not force her. They would in fact
rather not have her marry this particular man. Nor is there an immediate
economic pressure, as Mihaela has a relatively comfortable life with her
parents. But stories circulate about a certain Emilia who married abroad
and now lives comfortably doing nothing as a housewife and living a life of
glamour in the Occident with daily trips to McDonalds. These rumors
produce their own pressure, they create desire, and thus migration leads to
further migration. Mihaela too can do what these other women have done,
proving her worth as a woman. Besides, she wants a better life, and she
wants to publish her poems (one wonders who reads Romanian poetry in
Italy). Mihaela is not a victim; a European marriage is what she wants. This
is also what she has been induced to want both by the long history of the
cold war with its glimmers of a forbidden heaven in the West and by the
post-1989 predicament, with its deferred promises of democratic consumerism. Mihaela is a subject, in both senses of the word, which is not in
contradiction with the fact that, at a structural, systemic level (“European
kinship”), she is also an object of traffic.48
What is the situation of Romanian men in this predicament? In Occident, Lucian is representative of a confused sense of masculinity. He is a
researcher, but he has a job in advertising, walking around the city as a
mascot. (“Commodities have a soul, too,” he is told. His job is to give soul
to a beer bottle.) It is clear that the future has nothing bright in store for
him. In his personal life, he is confronted with oppressive poverty. At the
very beginning of the film, Lucian and his fiancé, Sorina, find their things
in the middle of the street, as they have just been evicted from their apartment. The viewer is unsure whether this is good or bad because the building in which they lived (the literal ruins of “real-existing socialism”) looks
hardly livable. Their only hope is an old aunt, who owns an apartment in
48. I am responding here to a wave of feminist scholarship over the last decade that revolved
around the often unilateral insistence that women have agency. In terms of the conversation here,
this scholarship has meant to argue that women being trafficked, most often into prostitution, are
agents in their own right, and that to claim otherwise is to risk a moralizing stance that attempts to
rescue them from their choice. It would seem like choice makes a parody of itself in situations in
which one sells oneself because there is nothing else to sell.
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another decrepit building. The aunt would have to die to make space for
the new generation, and yet she does not because she is waiting for her son,
who has disappeared in Germany. As Lucian and Sorina discuss their future, he is literally knocked down, hit by a bottle, and throughout the film
he does not seem to be able to overcome something like a permanent
headache, the immediate source of his confusion.
Sorina has reached the point at which it seems like the only solution to their
problems is emigration. For reasons that are not completely clear, Lucian resists. “This is our home,” he reminds her timidly. It is not an argument anymore. “Why should I go,” he asks a friend, “to clean toilets there?” Besides, he
thinks it is his duty to care for the dying aunt. But Lucian finds himself in the
paradoxical position in which he cannot “compete” for his own fiancé. The
“best women” have become “export material.”49 The result is a clear sense of
emasculation. This loss of masculinity is not necessarily something to be deplored, as Romanian culture has a significant macho dimension in need of a
more balanced gender dynamic. But if change is to have lasting effects it should
perhaps not be the outcome of transnational humiliation.50
Occident is ultimately an ironic comment on the Golden Age of “realexisting socialism.” In a central scene in the film, Lucian and Mihaela struggle
to remember an old song from their childhood. They are surprised when the
tune and the words come back to them, as if from another life. It is a pioneers’
song about the year 2000, the projection for the millennial coming of communism. The generation we have been following had the glorious mission of
bringing the dream to fruition in the year 2000. But the century of communism has become obsolete, and it has abandoned its children. They now have a
choice between giving life to global capitalism locally or exporting their labor
power into the new promised land of the Occident. “Is this how you imagined the
year 2000?” Lucian asks.
The traffic-in-women concept continues to have a weak explanatory
power when it comes to contemporary kinship structures, however altered
and diffuse. It helps understand the networks of exchange within the European Union, which it makes visible as an anthropological structure, and
can function as a starting point for a possible critique of its underlying
political economy. If Occident indeed offers a genuine critique of European
49. “Export material” is a line in another Romanian film on the traffic in women, Asphalt
Tango (dir. Nae Caranfil, 1996).
50. This argument parallels accounts of African American men in the wake of slavery,
which did not allow them rights of circulation over African American women. On the one
hand, the situation has tragic consequences for the African American community; on the other,
one is less inclined to champion men’s rights to the benefits of masculinity; see AC, p. 73.
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kinship, the impact it could have is diminished not only by the fact that
most Eastern Europeans (including Romanians) have never seen it, having
only circulated on international film festival routes, but also by the fact
that in public interviews Mungiu often denies the political implications of
his work. In the Romanian political landscape, the European Union can
only be embraced. Only the nationalist right is critical of “integration,”
and any critique risks the embarrassment of this association. The same
neoconservative predicament has made feminism an insult word, and
Mungiu would not want to be thus labeled. As a result, he insists he makes
comedies, and, indeed, during the screening of Occident the movie theater
is filled with laughter. But we have come to know that there is laughter and
and then there is laughter, and the long, hysteric bursts that punctuate the
film’s marriage market scenes offer their own logic of critique.51
Film might have become “the most important art” in Eastern Europe
once again. Today it is a medium to have politicized European kinship.52 It is as if film comes to remind us that critique—if possible,
without its paranoid dimensions—is the proper business of European
intellectuals in Eastern and Western Europe. The European Union is
still in the making, and, for a while at least (how long?), it remains a
promise that we might want to pursue in order, not to create a more
symmetric, equal structure of exchange, but precisely to rethink exchange and, alongside it, community and solidarity.53 Europe is an
opening/opportunity to play with kinship such that the black Italian is
not a structural impossibility and Eastern Europe is not the handmaid
of Europe. In the meantime, an arranged “marriage” between Luigi and
Mihaela does seem a good idea, if it is understood as a comradeship/
aimance between South and East on European territory, but only insofar as the two work against the mediation of Europe, which has
historically predetermined their relation, for the sake of Europe.
As of yet, Mihaela’s story seems to confirm the European traffic in
women in the global European moment. Mihaela is sad as she leaves, saying good-bye to the man she loves, who in his turn is mourning the loss of
his love-object bound for Europe. “We do what we have to do,” she tells
51. I elaborate on laughter in my forthcoming book, Laughter: Notes on a Passion
(Cambridge, Mass., 2010).
52. A number of Romanian films have explored the traffic-in-women concept: Caranfil’s
Asphalt Tango (1996); Didi Danquart’s Offset (2006); Cristian Nemescu’s California Dreamin’
(2007); and Bobby Păunescu’s Francesca (2009).
53. It should be possible to speak of promise in relation to Europe while engaging the
actual politics of the European Union, however vulgar they might seem from the standpoint of
a strictly philosophical perspective. For the risks of the latter choice, see Rodolphe Gasché,
Europe, or the Infinite Task: A Study of a Philosophical Concept (Stanford, Calif., 2009).
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him. Her parents retire and return to the village from which “real-existing
socialism” took them. The experiment is over, they have just exported
their offspring, and there is nothing else to do.54 The young Romanian man
has been quiet all along and is left in a sad, deserted industrial landscape.
He can go back to his beers with his friends and talk infinitely about the
ones who left and the ones who are preparing to leave (an estimated three
million out of twenty million Romanians work abroad).55
As the film ends, there is no reason for the viewer not to go on speculating on what will happen to Mihaela in the Occident. I see two scenarios,
but will propose only one: Mihaela writes day and night, slowly moving
away from the poems of her youth, to test possibilities for relation at the (if
possible, unromanticized) limits of literature.56 Sooner or later she meets a
version of a “symbolic mother” (it could be a man), who invites her to join
a contemporary variation on the feminist bookstore. In time, they disseminate a new writing and its accompanying practices in a Europe in which
the narratives of women’s exchange and the Europe created in their folds
slowly become unrecognizable. “Communities,” Benedict Anderson
writes, “are to be distinguished, not by their falsity/genuineness, but by the
style in which they are imagined.”57 If Europe is not to miss its chance, it
needs to find a new style for collective imagination. Mihaela has a lot of
work to do. But I have high hopes for her.
54. An important dimension of becoming European across the East/West divide would
seem to still necessitate, twenty years after 1989, a European conversation on “the end of
communism.” On the one hand, 1989 made “unification” possible; on the other, as Balibar
argues, Europe and communism have profoundly intertwined histories and “the end of
communism,” understood literally, might put the very idea of Europe in crisis. Habermas
himself lists “solidarity” as one of the elements that binds Europeans together. Western
Europe’s disdain for Eastern Europe suggests, among other things, a disdain for the failures of
European communism in the East and the West alike. Europe would have to account for “realexisting socialism” not as some oddity from the East, with perhaps the implication of some
eccentric Western intellectuals, but as a thoroughly European phenomenon. This cannot mean
condemning it unequivocally (communism is not fascism), but actually processing the history
of what Balibar calls “the two circles” (state communism in the East/communist movements
and parties in the West). Once this happens, perhaps even the unfortunate phrase “real-existing
socialism” will slowly fade out of use.
55. Some estimates go as high as six million. The number of tax-paying, working
Romanians is only three million. The rest of the Romanian population is made up of children,
retirees, and the unemployed.
56. The privileging of literature as an experimental space for the thinking of relation has
often been justifiably critiqued, most recently in talks by Catherine Malabou. It is important to
note that the poststructuralist notion of literature at work here comes from a tradition
suspicious of literature itself; see Georges Bataille, The Impossible: A Story of Rats, Followed by
Dianus and by the Oresteia, trans. Robert Hurley (San Francisco, 1991). It is therefore often
divorced from the literary and is generous enough to include, among other forms of “writing,”
Malabou’s work in neuroscience.
57. Anderson, Imagined Communities, p. 6.
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